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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
CRIMINAL LAW-CERTIORARI-EFFECT OF DENIAL
State convict's petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court for direct review of their conviction was denied.' Held, it was error
for the federal district court to give effect and consideration to this denial
in a subsequent petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Brown v. Allen, 344
U.S. 443 (1953) (affirmed on other grounds).
The Supreme Court has often said that the denial of certiorari imports
no expression of opinion upon the merits of a case.2 However, nine years
ago the Court said that a federal court will not ordinarily re-examine issues
upon a writ of habeas corpus when certiorari has been previously denied.3
This inconsistency was magnified by the doctrine of Darr v. Burtord,4 a more
recent case, which states that a federal court may not entertain a habeas
corpus application unless the petitioner has exhausted all state remedies by
way of appeal, including in this category, an application to the United
States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. Thus, while denial of certiorari
was a prerequisite to habeas corpus proceedings by a state prisoner, there
was no clear cut opinion as to the effect to be given to that denial.
Since the conflict arose, the lower courts have arrived at opposite
interpretations. Several courts decided that the Supreme Court meant that
the denial of certiorari was to be given effect. 5  Other courts determined,
as the Supreme Court had previously determined, that the denial of certiorari
was of no effect whatever, where the court gave no expression of opinion.6
This left a pressing need for a new mandate from the Supreme Court.
The majority opinion of the court on this point was expressed by
Justice Frankfurter when he said . . . "denial of certiorari means only that, for
one reason or another . . .which may have nothing to do with the
merits . .. there were not four members of the Court who thought the case
should be heard."'7 The minority on this point, while not suggesting that
denial of certiorari should be stare decisis, stated that "there is no reason
why a district court should not give consideration to the record of the prior
certiorari to this Court and such weight to our denial as the district court
1. Brown v. North Carolina, 233 N.C. 202, 63 S.E,2d 99, cert. denied,
341 U.S. 943 (1951); Speller v. North Carolina, 231 N.C. 549, 57 S.E.2d 759, cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 835 (1950); 230 N.C. 345, 53 S.E.2d 294 (1949); 229 N.C. 67, 47
S.E.2d 537 (1948); Danicls v. North Carolina, 231 N.C. 509, 57 S.E.2d 653,
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 954 (1950); 231 N.C. 341, 56 S.E.2d 646 (1949); 231 N.C. 17,
56 S.E.2d 2 (1949).
2. Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912 (1950); House v. Mayo,
324 U.S. 42 (1945); United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482 (1923); Hamilton Brown
Shoe Co. v. \Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U.S. 251 (1916).
3. Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944); accord, White v. Ragcn, 324 U.S. 760
(1945); House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42 (1945).
4. Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950).
5. Anderson v. Edison, 191 F.2d 989 (8th Cir. 1951); Adkins v. Smyth, 188
F.2d 452 (4th Cir. 1951); Scheclitman v. Foster. 172 F.2d 339 (2nd Cir. 1949).
6. United States v. 1lohn, 198 F.2d 934 (3rd Cir. 1952); Hawk v. Hann, 103 F.
Supp. 138 (D.Neb. 1952).
7. id. at 439.
CASES NOTED
feels the record justifies. '" Justice Jackson expressed a third view to the
effect that no lower federal court should entertain a habeas corpus petition
from a state prisoner unless there is a jurisdictional problem whereby there
is no adequate remedy available.9
Since the denial of certiorari means only that the Supreme Court did
not deem the questions presented therein of sufficient importance
for their consideration, it seems harsh that this should be the last appeal
to the courts by a man condemned to die. Denial of certiorari should be
given effect only when an opinion is expressed.
Larry J. Hoffman
PROCEDURE-FEDERAL RULES-
VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL
Plaintiffs filed suit for specific performance of a contract of sale and
moved for an injunction pendente lite, which was denied. Plaintiffs then
filed a notice of appeal and applied for a stay pending appeal. This stay
was also denied. After an order to show cause why plaintiffs should not be
enjoined from instituting an action in another jurisdiction based on the
same subject matter, had been directed to them, but before the return day
of the order, plaintiffs filed their notice of voluntary dismissal.1 Upon a
denial of defendant's motion to vacate the notice of dismissal, defendant
appealed. Held, although neither an answer nor a motion for summary
judgment had been filed, a literal application of the rule would defeat its
purpose of preventing arbitrary dismissal after an advanced stage of the
suit had been reached. Harvey Aluminum, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co.,
203 F.2d 105 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 73 Sup. Ct. 949 (1953).
Before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure a plaintiff
had an absolute right to discontinue or dismiss his action at law at any time
prior to verdict or judgment.2 By virtue of the Conformity Act3 federal
courts were bound in matters of practice in actions at law, including questions
of voluntary dismissal, by the practice of the state courts in the territories
in which the respective federal courts had jurisdiction.4 The plaintiff's right
8. Id. at 407.
9. Id. at 423.
I. FMn. R. Civ. P. 41 (a) (i), as amended (1946). Florida rule provides for similardismissal under FLORIDA CoMMor LAw RXrLE 3 (a)(i). ", . . an action may be
dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court (1) by filing a notice of dismissal
at any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or of a motion for summaryjudgment, whichever first occurs ......
2 . In re Skinner & Eddy Corp., 265 U.S. 86 (1924); Barrett v. Virginian R.R.,250 U.S. 473 (1919 ); McGowan v. Columbia River Packer's Ass'n, 245 U.S. 352 (1917);
Confiscation Cases, 7 Wall. 454, 457 (U.S. 1869); Veazic v. Wadleigh, 11 Pet. 55(U.S. 1837); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Stack, 60 F.2d 830 (4th Cir. 1932).
3. Rav. STAT. § 914 (1874), 28 U.S.C. §724 (1948).
4. Barrett v. Virginian R.R., 250 U.S. 473 (1919); Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U.S. 426(1875).
